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The directors board has a main function of controlling the top executives. When 
adopting a view of the firm as the shareholders property, it seems that the best 
executives' incentive is to give them stock options. However, when considering the 
firm as a framework of both explicit and implicit contractual relations, it appears 
that the top executives job is not only to satisfy the firm shareholders, but more 
generally to maintain the firm coalition alive and even to develop it. In that case, 
the directors board needs to receive some more detailed information in order to 
evaluate the top executives. We propose to rely on a reporting based on both an 
activity analysis and a stakeholder approach. The balanced scorecard model could 
even be a main support for the elaboration of the reporting information to the 
board. 
 
Corporate governance appears to be one of the most important factor of 
performance for the public firms. In France, a 1999 report (called Vienot 
Report) from a group of public firms’ CEOs was entitled “Report from the 
committee on the corporate governance”. The main subjects of discussion were: 
 The separation of the chairman and chief executive officer functions. 
 The publicity of the top managers remuneration in the public firms. 
 The publicity of the stock option plans in the public firms. 
 The nature of the information released about identity and the functions of 
the Board members. 
 The information on the Board meetings and on the Committees’ 
composition. 
 
** The author is very grateful to the participants of the 2001 EIASM workshop on ‘performance 
measurement and management control’ in Nice, for their remarks and commentaries. 
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The aspects of the corporate governance which were discussed were in fact 
very strongly linked to the enforcement of the shareholders’ information and in 
some way to the shareholders’ empowerment. The focus on these aspects of 
corporate governance is not specific to France, as we observed the same interest 
in the United States, with the importance of the Pension Funds, and in Great 
Britain. 
 
From a theoretic point of view, it seems that the firm is definitely 
apprehended as the shareholders property (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Fama 
1980, Jensen and Meckling 1976). Little is said about the other firm’s 
stakeholders just as the employees, the bondholders, or even the clients and the 
suppliers. However, according to some authors, it seems that the firm, as a 
nexus of contract (Williamson and Winter 1991), cannot be reduced to its 
shareholders but should embrace all its stakeholders (Cyert and March 1963, 
Mintzberg 1983, Freeman 1984). 
 
One main difficulty of the stakeholder theory is that there is not a unified 
concept of stakeholders. We will rely on the discussion offered by Donaldson 
and Preston (1995). So our approach will be both instrumental and normative. 
However some questions remain. For whom should the firm well perform ? And 
does is exist some performance optimum just as a Pareto optimum ? Mintzberg 
(1983), when identifying the power in and around the organizations, took a very 
descriptive view and considered that the firm overall performance resulted of 
the relative power of the groups or individuals. As we will rely on a normative 
approach we will suppose that a firm will well perform if all the stakeholders 
are satisfied and gratified for their contribution to the firm overall performance. 
 
In the corporate finance approach, the board is the main instrument of the 
shareholders to incite the CEO to maximize the shareholders’ return. In the 
stakeholders’ approach, the role of the board will be even more important, as it 
will not only control that the CEO main decisions comply with the 
shareholders’ interests, but also that all the other stakeholders are satisfied in 
order to keep the firm going on. From some point of view, the stakeholders’ 
approach is a way to relieve the CEO from an excessive attention to the short 
term financial results and to redirect its attention to the long term overall 
performance. 
 
So, what would be the corporate governance modifications if, instead of 
adopting a shareholders viewpoint, we retain a stakeholder approach. We do 
expect the board to use more diversified mechanisms to control and motivate 
the CEO. Even more, we do think that the main point will be the diversified 
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information the Board will be able to collect to evaluate the impact of the CEO 
decisions and the effectiveness of the strategy implementation. 
 
Unfortunately, most information dedicated to the Board is a financial 
reporting which offer little appreciation over the CEO real performance, as the 
main question about the performance observed is whether or not the cause of 
the problem lies in the person or the situation (Wong and Weiner 1981). So, the 
Board should conduct both managerial and environmental assessments (Walsh 
and Seward 1990). Usually, the Board will compare the company’s stock 
returns to other competitors’ return as an alternative to conducing a direct 
investigation of environmental constraints. 
 
It seems that this Board information is far from sufficient to have a real 
control of the top managers. We do propose a simple approach of both the 
firm’s stakeholders and the nature of the information system which should be 
implemented to ensure a real Board information. 
 
The article objective is then to propose a model where the reporting to the 
Board would rely on a good management control and would improve the 
corporate governance. We define the corporate governance (Charreaux, 1997) 
as: « all the mechanisms which are implemented for delimiting top executives' 
powers and influencing top executives' decisions », whether these mechanisms 
are implemented by the shareholders or by the other stakeholders. 
 
1. THE TOP MANAGERS' PERFORMANCE 
 
To define the top executives' performance, it is first needed to define the 
frame in which this performance will be appraised. The board of directors has 
the first task to control and evaluate the top executive officers and specifically 
the CEO (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Even if the board is issued from the 
shareholders, it cannot rely only on measures of shareholders' wealth. It will 
need to assess the CEO actions according to the expectations of all the 
stakeholders, in so far as the key-factor for performance is the firm cohesion. 
Moreover, in some cases, the directors board may have to arbitrate between the 
demand of the diverse stakeholders (Coff, 1999). 
 
1.1. The stakeholders framework for corporate governance: the 
 stakeholders flower model 
 
In corporate finance, the firm is usually considered as the result of "a 
complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals are brought 
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into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations" (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p.311). However, the contractual relations can be only explicit 
or both explicit and implicit. We will consider the firm as a nexus of explicit 
and implicit contracts. "Thus, a firm is not simply the sum of components 
readily available on the market but rather is a unique combination, which can 
be worth more or less than the sum of its parts" (Zingales, 2000, p.1633). 
 
We can then consider that one of the CEO's main objective is to keep alive 
the coalition of diverse stakeholders (Mintzberg, 1982). If, according to the 
finance theory, we may expect the shareholders to pursue the firm market value 
maximization, the salaries or the clients could expect some other kind of 
performance. One good example is Microsoft which benefits of a kind of 
monopolistic position which is very beneficial for its shareholders but of a poor 
interest for the clients who have no choice but to buy Microsoft's products. 
 
We will consider five different categories of stakeholders (Figure 1). The 
first one is composed of the executive officers who have to coordinate all the 
other categories (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, Fama, 1980). The other 
stakeholders considered are: 
 The Customers: if a flower has no roots, it won't last a lot of time. In the 
same sense, the customers are a vital necessity for a firm. 
 The Employees: they are the key resources of a firm. Just as the plant leaf, 
they are needed to help the firm grow. 
 The Suppliers: they do bring some other resources and, in some occasion, a 
part of internal resources (human resources) can be externalized and 
transmitted to some suppliers. So there exists some specific relations 
between the employees and the suppliers. 
 The Shareholders: whether we consider that the firm should be managed in 
the shareholders' interest or not, it remains evident that the flower is the 
resultant of all the other parts of the plant. If one part of the plant has been 
hurt, the flower won't be so beautiful and in some cases it won't even exist. 
 
Obviously, we could have enlarged our definition of stakeholders and we 
could have defined some other categories such as the government, the political 
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Figure 1. The Stakeholders' Flower Model 
 
1.2. The performance appraisal 
 
According to our view of the firm, the executives' performance should also 
include some social performance. "Corporate social performance can be 
analyzed and evaluated more effectively by using a framework based on the 
management of a corporation's relationships with the stakeholders than by 
using models and methodologies based on concepts concerning corporate 
social responsibilities and responsiveness" (Clarkson, 1995, p.92). In order to 
appraise the top managers' performance, it will be necessary to retain some 
different indicators reflecting not only the performance for the shareholders, but 
also the ability to maintain the stakeholders' coalition. For instance, a good 
CEO, who every year outstrips the market, might be confronted to very serious 
strikes if he totally neglects the firm's working force. As a result, the firm's 
market value will also go down. So, we might consider that the first quality of a 
top manager is to control his firm. That means, he must have not only to take 
the good decisions but he must also have the good information and his decisions 
ought to be implemented. 
 
 5 
Management, Vol. 7, 2002, 1, pp. 1-17. 
B. Pigé: Stakeholder theory and corporate governance: the nature of the board information 
Another main question relating the top managers' performance appraisal is 
to determine what the top managers should be hold accountable for (Baker, 
2000). In other words, which part of the performance belongs to the 
environment (the CEO good or bad luck) and which part belongs to the CEO. 
Just as a plant needs the sun to grow and to harmoniously develop (Figure 1), 
the firm development will depend of its environment. It is evident that the 
performance evaluation should not be the same if the market is very competitive 
or if there is an oligopoly or even a monopoly. In the same sense, it is usually 
more easy to perform correctly when the economy is booming than when it is 
recessionary. 
 
According to Walsh and Seward (1990), the performance appraisal should 
include: 
 The managerial assessment: "the board of directors needs to assess both the 
ability and efforts of the top managers of their organization" (p.424). 
 The environmental Assessment: "administrative scientists have spent years 
trying to determine the extent to which strategic choice or environmental 
determinism shape organizational performance. (…) This leaves the board 
with the unenviable task of determining such an attribution of 
responsibility. (…) In fairness, the board should strive not to penalize 
managers for outcomes truly outside of their control" (p.424). 
 
2. THE REPORTING DESIGN 
 
The board of directors will need some specific information to assess the top 
executives performance. It is a vital necessity to design a reporting and a 
management control system which could offer this information to the board 
with a guarantee of quality and fairness. 
 
2.1. The balanced scorecard analysis 
 
The performance appraisal can only be done through a multi-criteria 
valuation. If the board of directors relies only on the financial results, it will 
react very slowly to any difficulties arising. So, the board of directors should 
ask for a kind of reporting similar to the one designed for the top managers 
through the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996). 
"Several managers have asked whether or not the balanced scorecard is 
applicable to external reporting. If the scorecard is indeed a driver of long-term 
performance, shouldn't this information be relevant to the investment 
community?" (Kaplan and Norton, 1993, p.141). 
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Figure 2. Balanced Scorecard and Stakeholders' Flower Model 
 
The board should receive an information indicating the main actions 
undertaken and the main actors of these actions (Figure 2). So the use of both a 
model of strategic thinking and a stakeholder framework may help to reveal 
whether the CEO has the ability to really manage all his resources and to give a 
coherence to the entire firm. 
 
2.2. The activity and process analysis 
 
The financial accounting gives a fair and true view of the firm activity at a 
date and for a given period, but it does not explain the main reasons of the 
changes occurred, and it has difficulties to help predict the firm evolution. By 
contrast, the management accounting, when built over an activity analysis, 
allows a better analysis and an improvement of the reactivity to the 
environmental changes (Lardy and Pigé 2001). 
 
Usually the directors board get the information transmitted by the CEO 
who relies on a hierarchical analysis. We do expect this information to be more 
pertinent if, instead to be all embraced through a hierarchical analysis, it is 
presented through a process reporting based on an activity analysis (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. The specificity of a reporting system designed for the directors' board 
 
The CEO will always need the financial reporting to evaluate his 
subordinates. But the directors board is not concerned with these aspects. It is 
more interested with the information on the CEO ability to develop and improve 
the main firm processes (Figure 2). As each process is composed of several 
activities, we may imagine that the board could even get interested by a 
reporting on the activities. 
 
2.3. The combination of both approaches 
 
The reporting to the board will be best designed if it relies on both a 
process analysis and a balanced scorecard approach with references to the 
stakeholders. The executives should then provide a reporting model which 
would made appear the main firm processes with their objectives and their 
impact on the stakeholders' welfare (Figure 4). 
 
We will try to provide an example of this approach based on the Orange 
(one of the leader mobile phone company) analysis. 
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Figure 4. The combination of the stakeholders and the process approach 
 
3. REPORTING, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND CORPORATE  
 GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF ORANGE 
 
We rely exclusively on the information released by Orange for its IPO 
(Initial Public Offering) in February 2001 with some subsequent information 
collected on the Net. Orange is the mobile telecom subsidiary of France 
Telecom, the French leader of telecom. We provide an information system 
designed to reduce the residual loss due to the information asymmetry. We use 
an approach relevant to the main stakeholders, even if we expect the directors 
board to have the key function in controlling the CEO. 
 
3.1. Orange's main processes 
 
Orange organization is based on four business units (Figure 5). This 
organization is related to both a geographical and historical approach (the 
distinction between the United Kingdom and the French activities) and the 
nature of the services provided (the existence of a business unit for the 
diversified activities). 
 
The subsidiaries are different for each country of establishment, so the 
board could have information for every country unit. But a group is relevant 
only if the total is of a greater value than the sum of the parts. With this kind of 
information, the board will know the value of the parts (how successful are the 
business units in each country), and it will know the total value (which is then 
the result of the sum of the parts), but it will not be able to determine the factors 
which help generate synergies and it will have difficulties to discriminate 
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Figure 5. Organization chart of Orange SA 
 
The key information about the success or the failure of Orange, is the 
information on the top managers ability to develop transversal activities, that 
means activities which can be duplicated through all the countries and which 
allow customers who travel throughout Europe to have the same kind of 
services (even if some differences exist). So, the information addressed to the 
board should be fragmented through the main processes, of which the first six 
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Figure 6. Orange's main processes 
 
Figure 6 simplifies the activity analysis as we may think that some 
processes should be divided in activities. For instance, the technical servicing 
contains different aspects: the geographical territory cover, the frequency of call 
shut down, etc… 
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3.2. Orange's main stakeholders 
 
As many public firms, Orange has one main shareholder. It is also 
specifically dependent to some suppliers (Figure 7). There is a strong European 
concurrence as the market is relatively new and fast growing. 
 
Employees





























Figure 7. The Stakeholders' Flower Model applied to Orange 
 
3.2.1. France Telecom: the majority shareholder 
 
After the IPO, France Telecom detains between 79.4% and 84.5% of the 
capital according to the bonds which are detained by the public and which can 
be converted into Orange shares. The chairman of France Telecom board is also 
the chairman of Orange board. Orange chief executive officer is also member of 
France Telecom executive committee. 
 
France Telecom information will then be ensured by Orange top 
executives. However, Orange's objectives may not always be the same as those 
of France Telecom. One solution usually proposed is to give large amounts of 
Orange's stock options to the top managers. However, it could result in an 
arbitrage between France Telecom and Orange and if the executive officer is 
only interested by money, he will favor the firm where his monetary rewards 
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will be the greatest. Another solution is to try to reduce the information 
asymmetry by giving relevant information to Orange board. 
 
3.2.2. The minorities shareholders 
 
People who subscribed to Orange IPO are first interested by the share 
price. So the board needs to have a look on it. However, the firm market value 
is the result of the decisions implemented by the executives, not the opposite. 
To do its job, the directors board needs to consider some indicators related to 
the other stakeholders. Moreover, there is a need to some specific indicators for 
measuring the repartition of the created wealth between the minority 
shareholders and France Telecom. 
 
3.2.3. The employees 
 
Employees will contribute strongly to Orange development if they perceive 
it as being beneficiary to them. The firm development usually helps the 
employees to keep their job and even to be promoted for some of them. We may 
then retain some indicators which should obviously be completed (Figure 8). 
 
Employees expectations
To have a job
Indicator
The evolution of the number of employees
To be well paid The salary expenses
To see her performance
recognized
The promotions
The shares plan  
 
Figure 8. Employees' expectations and reporting 
 
 
For Orange, these indicators take the following values (Table 1). These 
values should be analyzed through the diverse processes, in order to observe 
whether or not the employees are interested in their improvement (this 
information is obviously not public, so we present only the consolidated data).  
 
Moreover, the board of directors decided on his 12/01/2001 meeting to 
grant 75 million shares options which can be exercised between 2004 and 2011 
at a price of 10.00 Euros. These plans concern around 13 000 individuals. 
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Table 1. Indicators on employees expectations 
 
 31/12/2000 30/06/2000 (6 months) 31/12/1999 31/12/1998 31/12/1997 
Average number of 
employees 24 282 22 252 17 239 12 301 9 471 
Salary expenses 
(millions Euros) 999 449 666 432 315 
Average salary per 
employee (thousand 
Euros) 
41.1 40.4 38.6 35.1 33.2 
% of employees 
internally promoted 
(*) 
4,7%  4,5% 5,0%  
% salaries expenses 
allowed to the 
formation (*) 
5,54%  6,13% 6,77%  
Number of working 
days lost for strike 
(*) 
30 871  175 353 23 845  
Number of working 
days lost for job 
accidents (*) 
56 203  63 018 52 910  
 
(*) Data for the France Telecom group (including Orange) 
 
3.2.4. The customers 
 
Two factors seem determinant for Orange development (Table 2): 
 
 The evolution of the number of customers: with an approach through the 
kind of services subscribed. 
 The evolution of their consumption: how much do the customers pay for the 
different services subscribed and how do they use them. 
 
This information must be relativized by the market evolution. 
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Table 2. Indicators on customers expectations 
 


























































3.2.5. The suppliers 
 
As noted, in the prospectus of IPO (p.129), "the group is dependant of a 
limited number of suppliers for its network equipment and maintenance. Its 
results could be affected in a significant way if these suppliers would not furnish 
to the group the adequate equipment". So, the indicators used should indicate 
the capacity of the network, its average availability (does the network be able to 
respond to a sudden increase of the traffic), the number of key suppliers and the 
average turnover realized with each of them. 
 
3.3. The reporting indicators for the marketing process 
 
For a process, the reporting indicators should allow the directors board, but 
also the other stakeholders, to get information on the performance. One key 
aspect of this reporting is the choice of indicators, which are not necessarily 
derived from the financial accounting. 
 
For instance, according to Orange, the marketing activity aims to let know 
to the public the different offers. It is quite simple to collect the financial data 
about the costs incurred for this activity. But it will be necessary to determine 
some cost driver in order to determine what incurs a change in the resources 
consumed. Moreover, some performance indicators must be defined in order to 
establish a relation between the resources consumed by this activity and the 
result obtained. We may imagine that the board could receive a sheet containing 
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the resources consumed, the notoriety of the different offers (for instance 
through the use of customer inquiries), the market share, etc. (Figure 9). 
 
 Stakeholders Customers Employees Suppliers Shareholders 





To develop a good
relationship with the
advertising agencies




* The number of
televised spot




for the brand or
for the firm
The knowledge 
level of the 
different offers 
* The return on 
investment 
* The elasticity of 
the demand to the 
advertisement The market share of the firm
 





In the twenties, Ford decided that he could both pay more his employees 
and lower the price of the cars as he hoped to receive an increasing amount of 
order. His strategy was a winning-winning strategy where both stakeholders 
would profit and in return the shareholders would see a greater investment 
return. As the main shareholder, Ford was the primary beneficiary of this 
strategy. 
 
Today, Orange try to develop a strategy similar by proposing specific 
offers to its customers in order to increase the amount of the time consumed 
with their phone. The main difference is that the directors board should get 
information on the evolution of this new wealth repartition. To be able to 
evaluate the top executives, the board will need to get specific information on 
the effectiveness of the strategy implemented for all the firm stakeholders. 
 
We do think that the best reporting design for the board should include an 
approach based on both the stakeholders and the processes analysis. One key 
element to join both aspects would be to rely on a model similar to the balanced 
scorecard. 
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TEORIJA ZAINTERESIRANIH STRANA I KORPORACIJSKO 
UPRAVLJANJE: PRIRODA INFORMACIJA NAMIJENJENIH  




Temeljna funkcija nadzornog odbora je kontrola top managera. Ukoliko se prihvati 
ideja poduzeća kao vlasništva dioničara, čini se da je najbolji način motiviranja top 
managera dodjela opcija za kupovinu dionica. Međutim, kada se tvrtka promatra kao 
skup eksplicitnih i implicitnih ugovornih odnosa, proizlazi kako posao top managera 
nije samo zadovoljavanje dioničara tvrtke. Obaveza top managementa se, u tom slučaju, 
može izraziti kao održavanje i razvoj koalicije strana zainteresiranih za poduzeće. Tada 
nadzorni odbor mora dobiti opsežnije informacije kako bi mogao procijeniti uspješnost 
top managementa. U ovom se radu predlaže izvještavanje utemeljeno na analizi 
aktivnosti i pristupu zainteresiranih strana. Pritom bi za detaljnu razradu informiranja 
nadzornog odbora mogao poslužiti model "balanced scorecard". 
 17
 18 
